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SHOW ME THE MONEY: PUBLIC ACCESS 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY AFTER  
CITIZENS UNITED 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC has been called both a broadside assault on democracy and a victory 
for free speech. Both extremes exaggerate the importance of the case. On 
the one hand, the case denied Congress’s ongoing attempt to curtail cor-
porate domination of elections. On the other hand, the very assumption 
that the pre-Citizens United campaign finance regime had accomplished its 
stated goals of reducing corruption or its appearance is flawed. As a result 
of judicially imposed limitations on the federal campaign finance laws, 
corporations have been allowed to engage in all but unfettered election-
eering since the 1970s. Reform proponents should take advantage of a 
unique opportunity in history to marshal popular sentiment and create a 
new model of public access and accountability in the Internet age. This 
Note proposes a coding requirement in political advertisements that will 
allow viewers to easily identify a message’s funding source. 
Introduction 
 On January 27, 2010, a week after the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided Citizens United v. FEC,1 President Barack Obama voiced his disap-
proval of the decision in his State of the Union address: “[L]ast week, 
the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that, I believe, will open 
the floodgates for special interests . . . to spend without limit in our 
elections.”2 As the cameras turned to Justice Samuel Alito, who joined 
in the majority opinion, he appeared to utter the words “not true” un-
der his breath.3 A frenzy of outrage in the national media ensued: con-
servatives objected to the president targeting the judicial branch in a 
political forum, while liberals complained that Justice Alito should not 
have joined the political fray.4 
                                                                                                                      
1 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
2 See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address ( Jan. 27, 2010), in 156 
Cong. Rec. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010). 
3 See Robert Barnes, In the Court of Public Opinion, No Clear Ruling, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 
2010, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
01/28/AR2010012802893.html. 
4 See id. 
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 Public reaction to the decision was perhaps less dramatic but no 
less divided.5 Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont argued that Citizens 
United “turns the idea of government of, by and for the people on its 
head . . . .”6 Professor Richard Hasen assailed what he characterized as 
Chief Justice Roberts’s broken promise to “call balls and strikes,” and 
said the decision “opened up our political system to a money free-for-
all.”7 Former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith took the opposite tack, ap-
plauding the decision as a guarantee against state attempts to ban elec-
toral advocacy books.8 And Republican Senator Mitch McConnell ech-
oed Smith’s conclusion, saying the decision ended the suppression of 
speech.9 Other political leaders, journalists, and academics echoed the-
se divided sentiments.10 
 Sweeping declarations like these pervade the campaign finance 
discourse.11 But they are nothing new: in 1894, for example, Elihu 
Root, then an influential lawyer and later U.S. Secretary of State, called 
                                                                                                                      
5 See infra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
6 Susan Crabtree, Sen. Leahy: Court’s Decision Most Partisan Since Bush v. Gore, TheHill.com 
( Jan. 28, 2010), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/78527-sen-leahy-courts-decision-most-
partisan-since-bush-v-gore. 
7 Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers, Slate ( Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/ 
2242209. 
8 Bradley A. Smith, Opinion, Newsflash: First Amendment Upheld, Wall St. J., Jan. 23–24, 
2010, at A15, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045097045750 
19112172931620.html. The claim that Congress could ban electoral advocacy books—that 
is, corporate-funded books that expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate 
for national office—first arose during the government’s first oral argument in Citizens Unit-
ed, in March 2009. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29–30, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(No. 08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/08-205.pdf. In response to Chief Justice Roberts’s question whether Congress 
could prohibit a 500-page book that expressly advocated for the election of candidate X, 
Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart answered yes. See id. Not surprisingly, the gov-
ernment abandoned this position when the case was reargued in September 2009. See Citi-
zens United, 130 S. Ct. at 894–95; Transcript of Oral Argument at 64–66, Citizens United, 130 
S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/08-205[Reargued].pdf. 
9 156 Cong. Rec. S332–01 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. McConnell). 
10 See, e.g., Jan Witold Baran, Op-Ed, Stampede Toward Democracy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 
2010, at A23 (“Citizens United . . . will restrain Congress from flooding us with arcane, bur-
densome, convoluted campaign laws that discourage political participation.”); Daniel JH 
Greenwood, Beyond Citizens United: The Solution, Am. Const. Soc’y Blog ( Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/15154 (“The decision turns the First Amendment on its 
head.”). Even the satirical newspaper, The Onion, jumped into the fray with a news headline 
mocking the decision: Supreme Court Allows Corporations to Run for Political Office, The On-
ion (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.theonion.com/articles/supreme-court-allows-corporations-
to-run-for-polit,7071. 
11 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10. 
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corporate influence in politics “a constantly growing evil.”12 In 1957, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. United Automobile Workers ap-
proved the assessment of two historians that the power of corporate 
wealth “threatened to undermine the political integrity of the Repub-
lic.”13 Foreshadowing the next several decades of debate, the dissent in 
that case accused the majority of “abolish[ing] First Amendment rights 
on a wholesale basis.”14 
 These arguments exemplify the bitter divisions surrounding cam-
paign finance regulation.15 Critics denounce campaign finance laws as 
barriers to the free exchange of ideas, akin to trade restrictions.16 In 
their view, the government should not be trusted, nor did the framers 
intend it to be trusted, to decide who can and cannot speak.17 Propo-
nents, in contrast, focus on the particular dangers inherent in allowing 
unlimited corporate wealth to dominate the electoral process: the ad-
vantages corporations enjoy in amassing capital;18 the risk of corporate 
money corrupting, or at least unduly influencing, the political proc-
ess;19 and the marginalization of individual voters.20 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143–44 (Robert Ba-
con & James Brown Scott eds., 1916), quoted in United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 
U.S. 567, 571 (1957). 
13 Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 570 (quoting 2 Samuel Eliot Morison & Henry Steele 
Commager, The Growth of the American Republic 355 (4th ed. 1950)). 
14 Id. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Section 304, Taft Hartley Act: Validity of Re-
strictions on Union Political Activity, 57 Yale L.J. 806, 827 (1948) (arguing that the statutory 
ban on union and corporate expenditures “in connection with” federal elections violates 
the First Amendment). 
15 Cf. Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically Right, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 1095, 
1095 (2002) (noting that a leading campaign finance case is reviled by campaign finance 
critics and proponents alike, but for different reasons). 
16 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258–59 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
premise of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither sheep nor fools, 
and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of the speech presented to 
them and its proximate and ultimate source.”); Richard Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down 
the Gauntlet, 115 Yale L.J. 1699, 1705 (2006) (comparing the limitation of campaign adver-
tising to improve democratic participation to the curtailment of commercial advertising to 
increase consumption); Bradley Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform, Nat’l Affs., 
Winter 2010, at 75, 88 (arguing that campaign finance regulations restrict freedom of 
speech). 
17 See Smith, supra note 16, at 76. 
18 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
19 See Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2583, 
2661–62 (2008) (arguing against extending full First Amendment protections to corpora-
tions); cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 825–826 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (noting the “special dangers” that corporate spending may pose in the political 
sphere as a result of the state-conferred advantages of the corporate form). 
20 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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 Notwithstanding public consternation over the holding in Citizens 
United that corporations enjoy First Amendment protection commen-
surate with individuals,21 there is ample reason to doubt the decision’s 
practical significance.22 Judicial constructions of federal statutes limit-
ing corporate spending on elections have constrained the FEC’s power 
to control the flow of money into elections since the Supreme Court’s 
1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo.23 Moreover, Citizens United struck down 
a limited prohibition on corporate-funded ads, which had only been in 
operation since 2002.24 Although the decision’s doctrinal commands 
will bear significance for as long as it remains binding precedent, its 
limited practical effect should caution against overstated outrage.25 
 This Note contextualizes the recent shift in campaign finance juris-
prudence in light of the practical experience of the last four decades of 
political spending, and builds on reform-minded scholarship by propos-
ing a voter information-based disclosure regime.26 By way of back-
ground, Part I presents an overview of federal laws governing corporate 
electoral spending, beginning with a summary of the decision in Citizens 
United and then turning to the development of campaign finance laws 
from around the turn of the century.27 Part II then explains the modern 
era of campaign finance regulation beginning in 1972 with the Federal 
Election Campaign Act and the Court’s response to each new attempt to 
curtail corporate political spending.28 Part III analyzes the practical ef-
fects of Citizens United in light of the history of campaign finance reform 
and argues that the case is far less significant than its detractors con-
tend.29 Finally, Part IV reviews the remaining legislative options for the 
campaign finance reform project and argues that reformers should take 
advantage of a unique moment of popular anxiety over the growth of 
corporate power to develop effective disclosure measures; the Part pro-
                                                                                                                      
21 See Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign Fi-
nancing, Wash. Post (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html. 
22 See Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After 
Citizens United, 20 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 643, 646–50 (2011) (summarizing the nar-
row reach of corporate expenditure limitations); infra notes 177–239 and accompanying 
text. 
23 See infra notes 177–204 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 205–221 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 177–204 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 177–315 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 31–88 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 89–171 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 172–239 and accompanying text. 
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poses a coding requirement that gives voters an expedient way to learn 
the true financial and ideological source of political messages.30 
I. Background: A Century of Campaign Finance Laws 
 Campaign finance laws in America have come in fits and starts.31 
Between the trust-busting days of the late nineteenth century and the 
modern era of corporate excesses, efforts to limit the power of business 
in the political realm have been gradual, uncertain, and ineffective.32 
To illuminate this history, this Part begins with a summary of the 2010 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC to introduce the 
reader to the major themes in campaign finance jurisprudence and 
explain the case’s doctrinal meaning.33 It then turns back a century 
and narrates the development of campaign finance laws in America: 
key legislation, judicial responses, and political undercurrents.34 
                                                                                                                     
A. Citizens United: A Doctrinal Shift 
 The Supreme Court in Citizens United held that the government may 
not restrict independent corporate-funded electoral advocacy, overruling 
both its 1991 decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 35 and key 
provisions of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).36 Citi-
zens United, a conservative non-profit advocacy corporation, had pro-
duced a documentary critical of then-presidential candidate Hillary Clin-
ton and sought to broadcast it the month before the 2008 primary elec-
tion, in violation of section 203 of BCRA.37 The organization sued to 
prevent the FEC from enforcing BCRA’s thirty-day “blackout” period be-
fore the primary election, in which no corporate-funded electoral ads 
could appear on television in the district of the relevant national primary 
 
30 See infra notes 240–315 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 52–88 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 63–88 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 35–51 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 52–88 and accompanying text. 
35 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 652 (1991). 
36 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b 
(2006)). 
37 Id. at 887. Citizens United received most of its money from individuals but also ac-
cepted donations from for-profit corporations, thus falling outside an exemption for non-
profit corporations and within BCRA’s electioneering prohibition. See id. at 891; infra notes 
133–135 and accompanying text. Citizens United also challenged the disclosure, dis-
claimer and reporting provisions, but the Court upheld them. 130 S. Ct. at 913–14. 
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vote if the ads mentioned a candidate for office.38 The Court struck the 
provision down on First Amendment grounds.39 
 The Court in Austin had allowed the government—in that case, 
the state of Michigan—to restrict corporate electoral advocacy expendi-
tures in the interest of preventing what the Court described as the “cor-
rosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” on the 
political process.40 The “antidistortion” rationale, Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy wrote for the 5–4 majority in Citizens United, failed to justify 
BCRA’s blackout period or any other restrictions on corporate spend-
ing done independently of a political campaign.41 Regardless of the 
risk that the particular characteristics of the corporate form will “dis-
tort” the electoral speech marketplace, the First Amendment prohibits 
distinctions based solely on the identity of the speaker.42 
                                                                                                                     
 Framing the issue in this way, the Court effectively erased a century 
of attempts by Congress to distinguish, for election spending purposes, 
between individuals on the one hand and legal entities like corporations 
and unions on the other.43 The decision rejected the longstanding be-
lief underlying campaign finance laws that corporate and union money 
poses unique risks of corrupting political candidates and threatening 
the primacy of voters in the democratic process.44 When corporations 
want to spend their own treasury funds on political campaigns, inde-
pendently of an office-seeker’s campaign, they should be permitted to 
do so without government interference.45 
 After Citizens United, the government may no longer limit inde-
pendent corporate spending on political elections, whether or not such 
spending expressly advocates for or against a candidate for federal of-
fice.46 Because corporations enjoy First Amendment protections on an 
equal footing with individuals, laws that single out corporate speech for 
special treatment will be subject to the most rigorous scrutiny.47 Thus, 
burdens on corporate speech must be narrowly tailored to address a 
 
38 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. 
39 Id. at 896–900, 913. 
40 Id. at 913; Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
41 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. 
42 Id. at 903. 
43 See id. at 900–01 (discussing congressional attempts to limit political contributions 
by corporations and unions). 
44 See id. at 903–04. 
45 See id. at 906, 913. 
46 See id. at 913. 
47 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. 
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compelling government interest.48 Because section 203 of BCRA effec-
tively banned corporate speech for the blackout period before an elec-
tion, it could only withstand First Amendment scrutiny if it were justi-
fied by interests of the highest public necessity.49 Although corruption 
and the appearance of corruption remain cognizable interests that the 
government may address in narrowly tailored ways, the Austin Court’s 
antidistortion rationale—an “aberration,” in the Citizens United Court’s 
reading—fails to justify restrictions on speech.50 In fact, no claimed 
electoral danger, whether corruption, the appearance of corruption, or 
the distorting effects of corporate wealth, can undermine the principle 
that the First Amendment disallows political speech restrictions based 
on the speaker’s corporate identity.51 
B. The Pre-Reform Era: Corporate Theory in the Gilded Age 
 The view adopted in Citizens United of the corporation as a political 
constituent with full First Amendment rights is a modern development, 
but it has origins in industrial-era jurisprudence.52 In the late nine-
teenth century, the American business corporation underwent a dra-
matic period of growth, concomitant with the rapid industrial changes 
of the “Gilded Age.”53 A general concentration of wealth in the hands 
of a few coincided with growing popular distrust of industrial elites 
perceived to be enriching themselves at the expense of the general 
public.54 At the same time, the legal framework governing corporate 
action evolved to allow greater freedom to pursue profits without gov-
                                                                                                                      
48 Id. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. at 907. 
51 See id. at 903, 906–07. 
52 Cf. Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fic-
tion, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1745, 1751 (2001) (noting that, in the Fourteenth Amendment 
context, the Court has consistently adhered to the principle that corporations count as 
persons). 
53 See United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957) (“The concen-
tration of wealth consequent upon the industrial expansion in the post-Civil War era had 
profound implications for American life.”). The “Gilded Age” refers to the period of in-
dustrial expansion, immigration, and economic growth between the end of the Civil War 
and the turn of the century. See Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 Colum. 
L. Rev. 345, 370 (1977). The term generally refers to a period of perceived political cor-
ruption by the large American trusts. Id. The term took root following the publication of 
Mark Twain’s book of the same name, a fictional story of greed, lobbying, and corruption 
that chronicled the lives of several characters involved in land speculation. See generally 
Mark Twain & Charles Dudley Warner, The Gilded Age (1873). 
54 See Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 570. 
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ernment interference.55 States gradually eliminated the common law 
requirement of the early years of the American republic that corpora-
tions serve a public purpose56 and instead allowed incorporation for 
any lawful purpose.57 As the corporate form was made universally avail-
able, the old view of the corporation as an artificial organization grant-
ed special privileges by the state––the so-called “concession theory”––
gave way to the modern view of the corporation as a natural and ordi-
nary business entity.58 
 The U.S. Supreme Court was friendly to these changes and devel-
oped a legal framework recognizing that corporations enjoy at least 
some of the same constitutional rights as natural persons.59 Most nota-
bly, in 1886 the Court announced in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad Co. that corporate “persons” enjoy the same right to equal pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment as natural persons.60 That 
decision and subsequent changes in legal doctrine facilitated the expan-
sion of corporate power and “shifted the presumption of corporate reg-
ulation against the state.”61 The view of the corporation as a natural 
business entity implicitly predominates in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
today, with arguments premised on the special, state-conferred nature of 
the corporation often relegated to dissenting opinions.62 
                                                                                                                      
55 See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Man-
agement Treatises, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 562 n.4 (1981) (book review). 
56 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 637 (1819). Chief 
Justice Marshall defined the corporation as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law.” Id. at 636. The power of the early corporation was 
limited, he noted, to “only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon 
it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.” Id. 
57 See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 202 (observing that 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, the “notion of the corporation as a natural 
creation of private initiative and market forces replaced the idea that the corporation was 
artificial”). 
58 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960, at 
72–73 (1992). The concession theory of corporate law posits that because a state concedes 
the privilege of incorporation, which includes limited liability for shareholders and favor-
able tax treatment, states can in turn heavily circumscribe the powers of a corporation. See 
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 8–10 (1990). 
59 See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); see also Sanford 
A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 563, 
566–67 (1987). 
60 See Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. at 396. 
61 See Horwitz, supra note 58, at 74. 
62 See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 508 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S., 765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he mere creation of a corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by 
natural persons.”). 
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 The industrial expansion and perceived abuses of capitalism led to 
a reform movement aimed at limiting corporate influence over the leg-
islature and restoring control of the political process to voters.63 During 
the Progressive Era in the late nineteenth century, movement leaders 
railed against the use of corporate money to finance political candi-
dates, claiming that it tended to corrupt the political process.64 The 
influential lawyer Elihu Root, for example, argued in 1894 for a New 
York state constitutional amendment “to prevent . . . the great aggrega-
tions of wealth[] from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, 
to send members of the legislature to these halls, in order to vote for 
their protection and the advancement of their interests as against those 
of the public.”65 Root, a key proponent of later reforms, believed that 
laws against bribery were insufficient to guard against the undue influ-
ence corporations wielded and the consequent erosion of popular con-
fidence in government.66 
C. Reform Takes Hold: 1907–1972 
 Although efforts at campaign finance reform in the late nineteenth 
century failed, by the time Theodore Roosevelt was elected president in 
1904 under a taint of corruption, public opinion had crystallized in fa-
vor of limiting corporate spending on elections.67 Controversy over Roo-
sevelt’s campaign receiving large donations from corporations, amount-
ing to seventy-three percent of his campaign war chest, spurred Roose-
velt to support reform.68 In 1905, he argued to Congress that “[a]ll 
contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any po-
litical purpose should be forbidden by law.”69 Congress responded by 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 508 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing “momentum 
for civic reform” in the wake of post-Civil War industrial expansion). In 1957, the Supreme 
Court, in Automobile Workers, told the story this way: “The nation was fabulously rich but its 
wealth was gravitating rapidly into the hands of a small portion of the population, and the 
power of wealth threatened to undermine the political integrity of the Republic.” 352 U.S. 
at 570 (quoting Morison & Commager, supra note 13, at 355). 
64 See, e.g., Root, supra note 12, at 143–44. 
65 Id. at 143 (emphasis added). 
66 See id. at 144. 
67 See A. Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law, in A. 
Corrado et al., Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook 27 (A. Corrado ed., 1997). 
68 See Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 1, 
12, 15 (2008). 
69 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1906). 
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passing the Tillman Act of 1907, which prohibited bank and corporate 
contributions to national candidates or parties.70 
 Congress slowly tinkered with the campaign finance framework 
throughout the twentieth century.71 In 1910, Congress passed the Pub-
licity Act, which required post-election disclosure of all donations above 
one hundred dollars in election years to House candidates.72 Fifteen 
years later, in 1925, Congress added disclosure requirements for any 
congressional candidates, including senators, receiving corporate mon-
ey in any year.73 
 In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act over President Tru-
man’s veto, bringing unions within the Tillman Act’s prohibition on 
direct contributions to candidates, and adding broad language banning 
corporate or union spending “in connection with” a candidate for fed-
eral office.74 
 The Tillman Act and its successor statutes proved to be profoundly 
ineffective tools to limit money in politics— “[m]ore loophole than 
law,” as President Lyndon Johnson concluded.75 Congress neglected to 
establish a functioning regulatory regime to monitor and enforce the 
new limits.76 In addition, corporations found and exploited loopholes 
by keeping full-time campaign workers on the company payroll, donat-
                                                                                                                      
70 Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b (2006)). The Act provided that: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by 
authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connec-
tion with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for any 
corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any 
election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a Representa-
tive in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any State legislature of a 
United States Senator. 
Id. 
71 See infra notes 72–98 and accompanying text. 
72 Publicity Act, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822, 823 (1910) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 434). 
73 Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070, 1070–74 (repealed 
1974). 
74 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 
(1947) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b) (making it unlawful for corporations to 
“make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office, 
or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select 
candidates for any political office” (emphasis added)). 
75 See Marty Jezer et al., A Proposal for Democratically Financed Congressional Elections, 11 
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 333, 333 & n.6 (1993); see also Corrado, supra note 67, at 29; Bradley 
Smith, Searching for Corruption in All the Wrong Places, 2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 187, 191. 
76 See Corrado, supra note 67, at 29. 
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ing non-cash items to the campaigns, and simply reimbursing individ-
ual corporate directors for large donations to favored politicians.77 Nev-
ertheless, the early statutes represented “the first concrete manifesta-
tion[s] of a continuing congressional concern for elections free from 
the power of money.”78 
 In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. United Automo-
bile Workers, began its attempt in the latter part of the twentieth century 
to balance these increasingly restrictive federal enactments on corpo-
rate spending against the First Amendment implications of attempting 
to cork the flow of corporate money into politics.79 That decision re-
jected a union’s First Amendment challenge to the Taft-Hartley Act af-
ter the union was indicted for buying a campaign ad out of its general 
treasury funds.80 In so doing, the Court endorsed the importance of 
two government interests whose characterization later came to domi-
nate the debate between reformers and their critics: preventing corrup-
tion and the appearance of corruption.81 In upholding the broad-
based ban on spending “in connection with” federal elections, the 
Court sought to protect what it defined as “the integrity of our electoral 
process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the 
successful functioning of that process.”82 The court dismissed the First 
Amendment concerns with the statute as “abstract issues of constitu-
tional law.”83 
 The Court’s reluctance to address the First Amendment concerns 
of campaign finance laws, however, would not last long.84 Indeed, the 
three dissenting justices in Automobile Workers argued that the Taft-
Hartley Act was a “broadside assault on the freedom of political expres-
sion guaranteed by the First Amendment.”85 When Congress seeks to 
address an evil such as political corruption or the appearance of it, the 
dissenters argued, any regulatory measure must be “narrowly drawn” to 
                                                                                                                      
77 See Bradley A. Smith, Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform 
18, 24 (2001); Urofsky, supra note 68, at 17. 
78 See Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
79 See generally 352 U.S. 567. 
80 See id. at 568–69, 592–93. 
81 Id. at 570 (recognizing popular outrage with corporate abuses). 
82 Id. 
83 See id. at 592. 
84 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1976). After 1976, the Court deferred to 
Congress and state legislatures for laws limiting contributions to candidates, but analyzed 
expenditure limitations under Buckley’s First Amendment balancing approach. See, e.g., 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 149, 162 (2003). 
85 Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 598 (Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C.J. & Black, J., dissent-
ing). 
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meet the evil that government intends to control.86 This reasoning 
would become the dominant mode of analyzing campaign finance laws 
in the years to come.87 The new legal battleground, beginning with 
Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, pitted the need to minimize the evils of political 
corruption against the restrictive command of the First Amendment.88 
II. Full-Fledged Reform and Judicial Cutbacks 
 Having surveyed early American attempts to curtail corporate 
spending on elections, this Note next turns to the modern era of cam-
paign finance legislation and the judicial response to it.89 This Part 
aims both to sketch out the modern doctrinal framework of corporate 
electoral spending and to set up a discussion in Part III suggesting that 
corporations have endured few meaningful limitations on their politi-
cal spending since the 1970s.90 After introducing the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and the U.S. Supreme Court’s limita-
tions on it in the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo,91 this Part reviews the leg-
islative and judicial adjustments to the campaign finance system leading 
to the 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC.92 
A. FECA and Buckley: The Court Charts a Middle Ground 
 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was the country’s 
most comprehensive campaign finance reform effort to date.93 FECA 
limited individual, corporate, candidate, and political party activity in 
connection with national elections.94 It limited the amount individuals 
could contribute to any single candidate to $1000 and set a maximum 
total annual contribution limit of $25,000.95 The law also imposed a 
                                                                                                                      
86 Id. at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
87 See infra notes 101–106 and accompanying text. 
88 See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Rationale, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 346 
(2009) (“The Buckley v. Valeo line of cases has forced courts to balance two interests against 
each other—the right to free political speech and the societal interest in being free from 
corruption.”). 
89 See infra notes 93–171 and accompanying text. 
90 See infra notes 172–239 and accompanying text. 
91 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976). 
92 See 130 S. Ct. 876, 876 (2010); infra notes 93–171 and accompanying text. 
93 See Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
(1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). 
94 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12–13 (“[FECA] includes restrictions on political contribu-
tions and expenditures that apply broadly to all phases of and all participants in the elec-
tion process.”). 
95 FECA § 608, 86 Stat. at 9–10. 
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$1000-per-year ceiling on independent expenditures made “in connec-
tion with a candidate” and strengthened existing disclosure and report-
ing requirements.96 Three years later, in response to revelations about 
President Nixon’s financial abuses in the 1972 presidential campaign,97 
Congress passed comprehensive amendments to FECA, including: strict 
limits on candidate contributions and expenditures, a provision allow-
ing limited corporate spending through political action committees 
(PACs), and the creation of the Federal Election Commission to moni-
tor and enforce the new rules.98 
 The modern era of campaign finance jurisprudence began when 
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed FECA’s constitutionality in 1976, in 
Buckley.99 In response to a facial challenge, the Court invalidated the 
act’s candidate spending limits but upheld the individual and party 
contribution limits as well as its disclosure and public financing provi-
sions.100 
 The Court’s approach in Buckley balanced the burden each provi-
sion placed on free expression against the governmental interest as-
serted to justify those burdens.101 At the outset, the Court noted that 
FECA operated in an area of core First Amendment activities because it 
affected the discussion of public issues and the qualifications of politi-
cal candidates.102 But the Court established an important conceptual 
dividing line between contribution limits and expenditure limits.103 
Contribution restrictions entail only “marginal” burdens on the donor’s 
expressive interests because giving money constitutes an undifferenti-
ated and symbolic act and relies on someone else to convert the money 
into speech.104 Expenditure restrictions, by contrast, place direct and 
substantial restraints upon the spender’s political speech because they 
limit the number of issues being discussed and the depth of their ex-
                                                                                                                      
96 Id. 
97 See Corrado, supra note 67, at 32. Detailed investigations revealed that Richard Nix-
on’s ability to outspend his opponent, Hubert Humphrey, was made possible by a reliance 
on large contributions, illegal corporate gifts, and undisclosed slush funds. Id. 
98 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 
Stat. 1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 26, and 47 U.S.C.); FEC, 
Twenty Year Report 8 (1995), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/20year.pdf. 
99 See Teachout, supra note 88, at 383–84 (identifying Buckley as the “single most influ-
ential case in the modern law governing political processes”). See generally 424 U.S. at 40–
44. 
100 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143. 
101 See id. at 20–21; Smith, supra note 75, at 192. 
102 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. 
103 See id. at 20–21. 
104 Id. at 21. 
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ploration.105 Moreover, expenditures pose little risk of corruption be-
cause, in the absence of coordination with campaigns, a political can-
didate has little use for independent corporate-funded ads.106 
 Although Buckley did not directly address the limits on corporate 
expenditures “in connection with” a national election, it introduced in a 
footnote an “express advocacy” requirement on the individual spending 
limitation “relative to a clearly identified candidate.”107 In the Court’s 
reading, that language could survive First Amendment scrutiny if it ap-
plied only to ads that use express words of advocacy or defeat: “vote for,” 
“vote against,” “defeat,” and so on.108 The Court adopted this construc-
tion to distinguish between “issue advocacy” —expenditures made for 
discussion of issues—and “express advocacy,” referring to “more pointed 
exhortations to vote for particular persons.”109 This construction avoid-
ed the need to invalidate the expenditure prohibition on vagueness 
grounds.110 Even assuming that independent expenditures posed risks 
of corruption, the Court reasoned, only ads that “in express terms advo-
cate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate” could be 
prohibited.111 
 This test came to be known as the “magic words” test, so named to 
point out the limited utility of a standard that exempts ads that have 
the intent and effect of influencing the outcome of an election, but do 
not in fact use the magic words.112 The Court later explicitly extended 
the “express advocacy” construction to the federal ban on corporations 
and unions using general treasury funds “in connection with” federal 
elections.113 
 Buckley’s dividing line between expenditures and contributions 
continues to operate upon campaign finance laws to this day.114 After 
                                                                                                                      
 
105 Id. at 19. 
106 See id. at 46 (“[T]he independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not 
presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those 
identified with large campaign contributions.”). 
107 Id. at 44 n.52. 
108 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 & n.52 (“This construction would restrict the application of 
§ 608(e)(1) to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or de-
feat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote 
against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”). 
109 See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (explaining Buck-
ley’s express advocacy requirement). 
110 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
111 Id. at 44. 
112 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S 93, 216–17 (2003). 
113 See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 249. 
114 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (striking down a state con-
tribution limit as too low to withstand even intermediate scrutiny); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 
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Buckley, corporations could not spend general treasury funds on ex-
press advocacy but they could spend freely on issue advocacy, whether 
or not its purpose or effect was to influence the outcome of an election 
for federal office.115 In contributions cases, the Court has reaffirmed 
the government’s compelling interest in preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption, as well as the conclusion that contribution 
restrictions impose only marginal burdens on speech.116 In expendi-
ture cases, by contrast, the Court considers the government’s interest in 
preventing corruption less compelling and the individual interest in 
engaging in political speech more substantial.117 Thus, a law that sub-
stantially burdens free expression must be narrowly tailored to a com-
pelling government interest, but a law that only marginally burdens 
free expression must meet an intermediate standard of review.118 
B. Life After Buckley 
 The first post-Buckley campaign finance case decided by the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the balancing approach even when the law at 
issue concerns only corporate spending, not individual spending.119 In 
1978, the Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti invalidated a 
Massachusetts law that prohibited corporate-funded advertisements on 
any vote, including referendums, other than those materially affecting 
the property, business, or assets of the corporation.120 In striking the 
law down, the Court noted that the government’s interest in preserving 
both the integrity of the electoral process and the citizen’s confidence 
in government are “interests of the highest importance.”121 The risk of 
corrupting an actual candidate, however, is not present in a referen-
dum on a public issue.122 Notably, the Court rejected the government’s 
asserted interest in preventing corporate wealth from drowning out 
                                                                                                                      
138 n.40 ( justifying an intermediate standard of review for contribution limitations); FEC 
v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003) (upholding a contribution restriction based on 
Buckley). 
115 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126, 164–65; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
116 Compare Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154 (applying intermediate scrutiny to contribution 
limitations), with Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (applying strict scrutiny to expenditure 
limitations). 
117 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 46. 
118 See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162 (contribution restrictions must be “closely drawn to a 
sufficiently important interest”). 
119 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978). 
120 Id. at 784. 
121 Id. at 788–89. 
122 Id. at 790. 
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other points of view: the government may not “restrict the speech of 
some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others . . . .”123 
 The Court in Bellotti avoided discussing the nature of the corporate 
form and instead emphasized the First Amendment’s role in affording 
the public access to free and open debate on ideas.124 An open ques-
tion remained, however, as to how much the government could limit 
independent corporate spending on elections for candidates, rather 
than issues.125 
 In 1990, the Court answered that question in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, a case involving a Michigan law prohibiting corpo-
rations from funding the advocacy of any candidate for statewide of-
fice.126 If corporations wanted to pay for campaign advertisements, 
Michigan law, much like FECA, required them to establish and admin-
ister a PAC and pay for political messages through donations solicited 
from the corporation’s shareholders.127 
 The Court in Austin upheld the Michigan statute based on a new, 
more flexible articulation of corruption than previously recognized.128 
It held that the statute’s burden upon a corporation’s expressive activity 
was justified by the government’s interest in reducing “the corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are ac-
cumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or 
no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
ideas.”129 In order to square this reasoning with Buckley’s proclamation 
that the government may not seek to restrict the voice of some entities 
by enhancing the relative voice of others, the Court characterized the 
Michigan law in terms of preventing corruption.130 The law did not 
attempt to equalize voices, the Court reasoned, but rather ensured that 
                                                                                                                      
123 See id. at 790–91 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49). The court also noted that the 
government made no showing that the corporate spending at issue had drowned out indi-
vidual voices. See id. at 789–90. 
124 See id. at 776. 
125 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26. 
126 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990). 
127 Id. at 655–56. In the case itself, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a corporation 
funded by annual dues from over 8000 members, of which three-quarters were for-profit 
corporations, sought to use its general treasury funds, rather than its PAC, to fund a news-
paper advertisement supporting a candidate to the state legislature. Id. at 656. Doing so 
would have violated the law. Id. 
128 See id. at 660. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. 
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election expenditures reflect “actual public support for the political ideas 
espoused by corporations.”131 
 This was not a new development in the Court’s reasoning, but it 
was the first time the Court had relied on the flexible “antidistortion” 
logic to approve a prohibition on for-profit corporations funding ex-
press advocacy of a candidate from general treasury funds.132 Only four 
years earlier, in 1986, the Court in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life 
had held such a restriction unconstitutional as applied to a non-profit 
political advocacy corporation.133 In both cases, the Court accepted the 
government’s argument that corporations, which benefit from a state-
conferred structure that facilitates wealth accumulation, skirted contri-
bution limitations by making independent expenditures on behalf of a 
candidate.134 Only in Austin, however, did the Court accept the conten-
tion that for-profit corporations, through their amassed wealth, create 
unique risks of monopolizing the political speech marketplace with lit-
tle correlation to actual public support for a candidate.135 
 FECA governed campaign finance for nearly three decades, sub-
ject to the limitations announced in Buckley.136 A new reform move-
ment began in 1998 after the Senate Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs released a report detailing widespread abuses and corrupt prac-
tices in the 1996 presidential election.137 The report outlined a 
“meltdown” of the campaign finance system caused by the “twin loop-
holes” of soft money and bogus issue advertising.138 The soft money 
loophole was the practice of political parties soliciting donations from 
corporations and channeling the funds through local party affiliates to 
                                                                                                                      
131 Id. (emphasis added). 
132 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; accord Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263 (“We ac-
knowledge the legitimacy of Congress’ concern that organizations that amass great wealth 
in the economic marketplace not gain unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”); 
FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) (recognizing the need to 
regulate “substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go 
with the corporate form of organization”); Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 585 (accepting the 
need to curb the political influence of “those who exercise control over large aggregations 
of capital”). 
133 See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263. 
134 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263. 
135 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658–59. 
136 See Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 283, 293–300 (2010) (noting that Buckley’s distinction between contribu-
tions and expenditures is “relatively robust” and reviewing the Court’s adherence to that 
distinction even while the justices disagree about the government’s interest in regulating 
corporate speech). 
137 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129–32 (citing S. Rep. No. 105-167, vol. 4, at 4611 (1998)). 
138 Id. at 129. 
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circumvent contribution limits to the national parties.139 The issue ad-
vocacy loophole allowed the proliferation of sham “issue ads” financed 
by corporations in order to influence elections while still in technical 
compliance with Buckley’s “express advocacy” limitation.140 In light of 
the Senate report’s findings and the Buckley standard, the reform 
movement’s challenge was to create a rule that both broadened the 
law’s reach to cover sham issue ads and avoided being struck down un-
der strict scrutiny.141 
C. BCRA’s S vocacy and  
Subsequent Judicial Narrowing 
B
e vote, and other generic campaign activities for 
atio
                                                                                                                     
tatutory Expansion of Express Ad
1. CRA: Addressing Soft Money and Sham Issue Advocacy 
 In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA) to address the two problems identified in the 1998 Senate in-
vestigation report.142 BCRA’s soft money provision banned national par-
ty committees from soliciting or receiving any funds not subject to FE-
CA’s limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements.143 This rule 
addressed the concern that political parties regularly asked donors to 
give money beyond the maximum amount under FECA by giving in-
stead to local parties that would in turn pay for voter registration, voter 
identification, get out th
n nal candidates.144 
 BCRA addressed the sham issue advocacy problem by creating a 
new definition of express advocacy subject to FECA’s general prohibi-
tion on corporate- or union-funded advertisements and its disclosure 
and reporting provisions.145 BCRA adopted the term “electioneering 
communications” to replace Buckley’s “express advocacy” limitation.146 
Electioneering communications under BCRA encompassed any broad-
cast, cable, or satellite communication that clearly identifies a candi-
date for federal office within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of 
 
 
c words test). 
1–103, 116 Stat. 81, 
82– d sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 court 
judg ds” test was “functionally meaningless”). 
139 Id. at 131.
140 Id. at 32. 
141 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (creating the magi
142 See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text. 
143 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 10
88 (2002) (codified as amended in scattere
144 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 165, 168–69. 
145 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189. 
146 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189–90; see id. at 193 (noting that all three district
es had agreed that Buckley’s “magic wor
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a primary and is targeted to the relevant voting electorate.147 Congress 
adopted this definition to avoid the kind of vagueness that troubled the 
Buckley Court in interpreting FECA’s prohibition on corporate expendi-
tures “relative to a clearly identified candidate.”148 Thus, under BCRA, 
all “electioneering communications” funded by union or corporate 
general treasuries were prohibited.149 
tes and parties circumventing otherwise valid con-
wers or listeners.”155 Genuine 
ue
                                                                                                                     
2. McConnell and Wisconsin Right to Life 
 In McConnell v. FEC in 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld both 
BCRA’s soft money provision and its “blackout” period for electioneer-
ing communications through a straightforward application of Buckley’s 
distinction between contributions and expenditures.150 Because the soft 
money provision addressed contributions, it involved only “marginal” 
burdens on free speech and could be upheld under an intermediate 
standard of review.151 To the extent that closing the soft money loop-
hole infringed such marginal speech interests, it did so to prevent the 
practice of candida
tribution limits.152 
 The McConnell Court also approved the electioneering communi-
cations definition, holding that the circumvention of federal campaign 
finance laws through “candidate advertisements masquerading as issue 
ads” justified imposing the 30- and 60-day blackout periods.153 Like in 
Buckley, the Court in McConnell upheld the restrictions through narrow 
statutory interpretation designed to avoid constitutional vagueness or 
overbreadth.154 “Electioneering communication,” the Court noted, re-
ferred “(1) to a broadcast (2) clearly identifying a candidate for federal 
office, (3) aired within the specific time period, and (4) targeted to an 
identified audience of at least 50,000 vie
iss  advocacy remained unregulable.156 
 Having accepted BCRA’s statutory definition of electioneering 
communications, the Court in McConnell went on to validate Austin’s 
 
147 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i), (C). 
148 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41. 
149 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)–(b); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204. 
150 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 138; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
151 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134–35. 
152 See id. at 137. 
153 Id. at 132. 
154 Id. at 194. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 206. 
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antidistortion rationale as a legitimate justification for government regu-
lations, even though it does not involve the traditional “quid pro quo” 
definition of corruption.157 The Court recognized that “unusually im-
portant interests underlie the regulation of corporations’ campaign-
related speech,” including “[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral 
process, preventing corruption, and sustain[ing] the active, alert re-
on
pplied to the 
                              
sp sibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct 
of government . . . .”158 
 Just four years after McConnell, however, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to 
Life, Inc., the Court backtracked on its endorsement of the antidistor-
tion rationale by creating a new standard that echoed Buckley’s magic 
words test.159  At issue in Wisconsin Right to Life was a conservative non-
profit advocacy organization’s advertisement opposing the use of fili-
busters to stall President George W. Bush’s judicial nominees.160 The 
advertisement fell within BCRA’s definition of electioneering commu-
nications because it was funded in part by corporate treasury funds, 
included a message urging voters to call Senator Russ Feingold, and 
would be aired within the blackout period.161 The Court held that an 
advertisement is only the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
(and thus regulable) if it is “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation 
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”162 
In other words, “Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes 
to the speaker, not the censor.”163 Both Buckley’s “magic words” limita-
tion and Wisconsin Right to Life’s “tie goes to the speaker” standard re-
flected the Court’s reluctance to allow the government to regulate 
genuine issue advocacy like the referendum ads at issue in Bellotti.164 
The Court went on to hold BCRA unconstitutional as a
advertisement at issue because it could reasonably be construed as 
something other than an appeal to vote for or against Senator Fein-
gold.165 
                                                                                        
 at 206 n.88 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 
788
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007). 
 
See 1 for a full explanation of the MCFL exemption. 
o Life, 551 U.S. at 470. 
kley, 424 U.S. at 44. 
157 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660). 
158 Id.
–89). 
159 See FEC v. Wis. 
160 Id. at 458–59. 
161 Id. at 458–60. The so-called “MCFL exemption” did not apply to the corporation at 
issue in Wisconsin Right to Life because it did not have a policy of rejecting corporate funds.
infra text accompanying notes 198–20
162 Wis. Right t
163 Id. at 474. 
164 See id.; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776; Buc
165 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 476. 
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 In Citizens United, the Court scrapped its attempts in Wisconsin Right 
to Life and McConnell to reconcile BCRA’s electioneering restriction with 
its post-Buckley First Amendment doctrine.166 Buckley, the Court rea-
soned, held that the government cannot attempt to equalize voices in 
the political marketplace––-exactly the justification relied on to uphold 
the spending restrictions in Austin.167 Moreover, Bellotti prohibited the 
government from making distinctions based solely on the corporate 
identity of the speaker.168 If these two principles––-no equalizing voices, 
and no distinctions based on the corporate form––-are to be taken at 
face value, then Austin could not possibly stand.169 Moreover, section 
203 of BCRA targeted core political speech, which is protected irrespec-
tive of who is speaking or how much money the speaker has.170 The 
Cour  
corruption; it ad market-
lac
                                                                                                                     
t concluded that the antidistortion interest simply does not address
dresses inequality in the political speech 
p e.171 
III. A Change Without a Difference: Practical Considerations 
in Corporate Political Spending 
 Notwithstanding the well-publicized drama at the State of the Un-
ion address, it is questionable whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 
decision in Citizens United v. FEC will alter the way corporations spend 
money on federal elections at all.172 Several historical and jurispruden-
tial realities diminish the importance of the case’s principal holding 
that corporations enjoy the same free speech rights as individuals to 
fund electoral advocacy, and its immediate legal effect of striking down 
section 203 of BCRA and overruling the Court’s 1991 decision in Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.173 This Part evaluates the practical con-
sequences of Citizens United and proposes that, with apologies to Mark 
Twain, reports of the death of popular democratic participation have 
 
ted, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
ns, the Court ex-
plai content.” Id. at 899. 
ncurring). 
zing 
the 
77–239 and accompanying text. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 
130
166 See Citizens Uni
167 See id. at 904. 
168 See id. at 898–99 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784). Such distinctio
ned, are “all too often simply a means to control 
169 See id. at 921–22 (Roberts, C.J., co
170 See id. at 892 (majority opinion). 
171 See id. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Austin’s reasoning was—and remains—
inconsistent with Buckley’s explicit repudiation of any government interest in ‘equali
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.’”). 
172 See infra notes 1
 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
173 See infra notes 177–239 and accompanying text. 
1048 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1027 
been greatly exaggerated.174 Indeed, arguments predicting a hitherto 
unseen flood of corporate wealth in elections fall flat against the history 
of campaign finance regulations, the limited nature of section 203, the 
continuing operation of disclosure and disclaimer requirements, and 
the nature of money in politics.175 The purpose of this analysis is to set 
up a discussion in Part IV that reviews the scholarly response to Citizens 
United and proposes legislative changes designed to minimize the risks 
of -
rm
reation in 1974, the ban on independent 
orp
 Even in the post-FECA era, however, there were only a few years of 
rig an on independent corpo-
rat r years after FECA’s enact-
                                                    
 corruption and undue influence by giving voters easy access to in
fo ation about the financial and ideological support behind political 
messages.176 
A. Campaign Finance Laws Had a Limited Effect Before Citizens United 
 The slow evolution of federal campaign finance regulations, be-
ginning with the Tillman Act in 1907, undercuts dramatic proclama-
tions that Citizens United portends a new Gilded Age where corporate 
interests trump the public interest and politicians do the will of the 
highest bidder.177 Corporations in the early twentieth century not only 
faced scattered and weak enforcement of the Tillman Act’s contribu-
tion ban (and thus no great deterrent to violating the ban), but also 
exploited glaring legal loopholes that allowed them to bankroll their 
favored campaigns with relative ease.178 Even after the enactment of 
independent corporate expenditure restrictions, corporations faced 
minimal barriers to political spending on television or in other national 
media.179 Until the FEC’s c
c orate spending on elections was not rigorously enforced.180 Thus, 
the relevant timeframe for evaluating the decision’s practical conse-
quences is, at the very longest, the period after Congress substantially 
amended FECA in 1974.181 
orous, to-the-letter enforcement of the b
e electoral spending.182 In 1976, just fou
                                                                  
ccompanying text. 
. 
ing 
 
174 See infra notes 177–239 and accompanying text. 
175 See infra notes 177–239 and a
176 See infra notes 240–315 and accompanying text
177 See supra notes 63–88 and accompanying text. 
178 See supra notes 75–88 and accompanying text. 
179 See FEC, supra note 98, at 7; Jezer et al., supra note 75, at 333 & n.6. 
180 See FEC, supra note 98, at 7. 
181 See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
182 See Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance 
Law, 3 Election L.J. 147, 147, 167 (2004) (noting that Buckley’s magic words test has been 
“ridiculously” easy to evade and concluding that McConnell v. FEC represented a “stunn
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ment, the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo established the “magic 
words” limitation allowing corporations to spend general treasury 
funds freely in national elections as long as the advertisements they 
purchased did not use express words of advocacy or defeat.183 Indeed, 
Congress sought to redefine Buckley’s “magic words” test with BCRA’s 
blackout period in 2002.184 In 2007, however, the Supreme Court, in 
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, revived the magic words limitation, stating 
that BCRA’s blackout period only extended to ads “susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against 
a specific candidate.”185 That language effectively placed the burden on 
the regulators because most “sham issue ads” (those that purport to 
expound on an issue but in reality call the viewer’s attention to a can-
didate’s position for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an elec-
tion) would be untouchable under that test.186 Thus, important judicial 
limitations on post-1974 corporate electoral advocacy statutes have 
een
                                                                                                                     
b  in place for all but nine years: 1974–1976, and 2002–2007.187 
 Those judicial limitations belie the inference that a flood of corpo-
rate spending on elections is imminent in the post-Citizens United 
world.188 Both Buckley, in 1976, and Wisconsin Right to Life, in 2007, pro-
hibited the government from regulating all but the narrowest class of 
advertisements, by a limited class of corporations—namely, for-profit 
business corporations or nonprofits that receive money from them.189 
The Court’s motivation behind both cases was to protect genuine issue 
advocacy––purely political speech––from the government’s regulatory 
reach.190 Similarly, the Court struck down the law at issue in Bellotti be-
cause, unlike in candidate elections where an actual politician might be 
convinced to do the bidding of a corporation, an issue cannot be cor-
 
triumph” for reformers because it validated BCRA’s definition of electioneering commu-
nications); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Comment: Two Concepts of 
Freed , 169 (2010) (noting that the Buckley distinction 
betw ation where “demand for political 
mon  has limited its supply”). 
 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52 (1976). 
 
r limitations 
on c
 U.S. at 469–70; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 & n.52. 
om of Speech, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 143
een contributions and expenditures created a situ
ey has remained unlimited while government nonetheless
183 See 424
184 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003). 
185 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
186 See id. 
187 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 646–50 (summarizing judicial and othe
ampaign finance laws); Briffault, supra note 182, at 156. 
188 See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469–70; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
189 See Wis. Right to Life, 551
190 See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469 (explaining that an intent-based test would chill 
political speech); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 
(1945)) (implying the same). 
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rupted.191 The First Amendment does not permit the government to 
target so baldly spending on speech solely because of the speaker’s cor-
porate form.192 Moreover, although the 1991 decision in Austin v. Mich-
igan Chamber of Commerce validated the government’s interest in mitigat-
g t
 to buy the most effective campaign ads, and prohibited from 
                                                                                                                     
in he “distorting” effects of corporate wealth, it did not overrule Buck-
ley’s “magic words” limitation.193 
 In practical effect, the Buckley/Wisconsin Right to Life standards have 
allowed corporations to purchase any electoral advertisements that fall 
short of calling for the election or defeat of a candidate for federal of-
fice.194 As the Court in McConnell v. FEC explained in 2003, “Not only 
can advertisers easily evade the line by eschewing the use of magic 
words, but they would seldom choose to use such words even if permit-
ted” because suggestive political ads are generally more effective than 
outright calls to vote for or against a candidate.195 Corporations have 
therefore faced restrictions only on ads they would not typically 
make.196 That observation cannot be overstated in evaluating the prac-
tical consequences of overturning Austin: since 1976, corporations have 
been allowed
 
191 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (observing that the 
risk y is not present” in a popular vote on an issue); see also 
supr
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regula
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mily values. 
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redo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying 
for P 05) (noting that savvy political operatives can 
easi
of electoral corruption “simpl
a notes 119–123 and accompanying text. 
192 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789. 
193 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (uphold-
ing the Michigan Campaign Finance Act of 1976). 
194 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193–94; Richard Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts 
Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1064, 1066 
(2008). As the Court in McConnell noted in appr
definition, Buckley’s “express advocacy” standard prohibited the government 
ting the following election advertisement: 
Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values but took a swing at his wife. 
And Yellowtail’s response? He only slapped her. But “her nose was not bro-
ken.” He talks law and order . . . but is himself a convicted felon. And though 
he talks about protecting children, Yellowta
support payments—then 
Yellowtail. Tell him to support fa
onnell, 540 U.S. at 193 n.78. 
195 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193. 
196 See id. at 216; see also McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 529 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (noting that modern campaign ads do not use express advo-
cacy because it is an ineffective way to convince voters to defeat or elect a candidate), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); John M. de Figuei
olitics, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 591, 623–24 (20
ly circumvent BCRA’s electioneering restrictions). 
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buying those ads they would be least likely to buy were they permitted 
to do so.197 
 The Court has also insulated certain corporations from regula-
tion.198 Even in the face of broad statutory language restricting corpo-
rate spending “in connection with” an election for federal office, non-
profit advocacy corporations have been exempt.199 In 1986, the Court 
held that the FEC may not subject a corporation to FECA’s restrictions 
if the corporation (1) was established for advocacy purposes, (2) did 
not have shareholders with an economic disincentive to severing ties if 
they disagreed with the corporation’s political views, and (3) had a pol-
icy of eschewing donations from business corporations.200 That exemp-
tion demonstrates that the Supreme Court does not consider the cor-
ora
of wealth corrupting the political process, 
but one of two possibilities: either a disagreement with Buckley itself and 
a co is-
rte
                                                                                                                     
p te form per se to create a danger of Austin-style corruption; rather, 
only the business corporation poses such risks because of its unique 
ability to amass capital to establish political war chests without any con-
nection to public support for an idea or candidate.201 
 The only constant restriction on corporate spending in national 
elections in the last one hundred years has been the Tillman Act’s ban 
on direct contributions to candidates, which the government did not 
reliably enforce until it established the FEC in 1974.202 Citizens United 
left those restrictions––-and with them Buckley’s distinction between giv-
ing money and spending money––-intact.203 Given that corporations 
have spent freely on federal elections for most of the post-Buckley pe-
riod, it follows that criticism of the result in Citizens United is not rooted 
in fear of an unforeseen flood 
rresponding belief that American elections have always been d
to d by corporate wealth and influence, or a simple misunderstand-
ing of the Buckley lineage.204 
 
197 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193–94. 
198 See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986). 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See id. at 259 (“Regulation of corporate political activity thus has reflected concern 
not about use of the corporate form per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment 
of wealth for political purposes.”). 
202 See supra notes 75–78, 96 and accompanying text. 
203 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. 
204 See supra notes 188–203 and accompanying text; see also Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of 
the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect, and Repetition in Public Debate, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 143, 
147–48 (2010) (noting that campaign finance reformers often repackage inequality con-
cerns as corruption concerns and assume that unequal economic power translates to un-
equal political power). 
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B. BCRA Itself Imposed a Minor Restraint in a New Media Landscape 
 Beyond the historical context outlined in Part III.A, the facts of 
Citizens United were limited to a narrow provision prohibiting ads in a 
narrow window of time before an election.205 That provision, though in 
some sense significant given its operation immediately before an elec-
tion, only slightly altered the myriad ways citizens receive information 
efob re making voting decisions.206 The advent of new media and con-
sumer controls over content has diminished the influence of television 
advertising in elections, making a statute like BCRA seem like a rela-
tively minor imposition.207 
 The modes and capabilities of political messaging are vastly differ-
ent today than they were throughout the twentieth century.208 Corpo-
rate expenditure limitations first arose in 1947, when television had be-
gun to play a unique and pervasive role in informing and influencing 
the public on issues and candidates for national office.209 Television 
continued to dominate the electoral marketplace throughout the twen-
ethti  century.210 BCRA itself covered only cable, satellite, and broadcast 
communications, suggesting a special concern by Congress that mo-
nopolization of those mediums by corporations posed unique distorting 
dangers.211 
 Today, however, the nature of the electoral marketplace is dra-
matically different.212 Cable and satellite providers compete to provide 
consumers with the best and most convenient control over content.213 
Viewers can now record their preferred programs in advance and watch 
them later or purchase them online.214 They can fast-forward through 
advertisements.215 Moreover, voters can now choose among an array of 
cable news programs that have specific ideological slants and whose 
                                                                                                                      
205 See 130 S. Ct. at 888 (explaining the statutory definition of electioneering commu-
nica
e 2008 presidential election to the television revolution in the 1950 presidential 
elec
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207 See Darrell M. West, Air Wars 63 (5th ed. 2010) (analogizing the Internet revo-
lution in th
tion). 
208 See id. 
209 See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartle
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211 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b, 434(f)(3)(A
212 See West, supra note 207, at 63. 
213 
4. 
214 See id. 
215 See id. 
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political ads often reflect those perspectives.216 The traditional para-
digm of television advertising providing campaigns and advertisers with 
cce
 and share content 
quickly and cheaply.220 Free and easily accessible information online 
diminishes th ertising, and 
er
ments to include a message disavowing affiliation with a particular can-
                                                                                                                     
a ss to a passive, seated audience with little control over content has 
been replaced by a new world of consumer preference and control over 
information.217 
 The growing role of the Internet in political campaigns, in particu-
lar, has allowed voters to choose their preferred sources of information 
and select individual stories and opinion pieces for their own informa-
tion consumption.218 Online newspapers, journals, and blogs provide a 
wide variety of choices from which voters can select political mes-
sages.219 These sources have opened public officials to heightened and 
more readily accessible scrutiny, as voters can find
e reach and scope of traditional television adv
th efore mitigates the practical impact of Citizens United.221 
C. Disclosure and Disclaimer Provisions Live On 
 Disclosure and disclaimer provisions also continue to operate on 
advertisers, making it all the more difficult to argue that an outright 
ban on corporate political spending prevents corruption or undue in-
fluence—or even “distorts” the electoral process.222 BCRA’s disclosure 
provision, for example, requires corporations spending more than ten 
thousand dollars on electioneering in a year to file a report with the 
FEC.223 The disclaimer provision requires corporate-funded advertise-
 
(2006) (chronicling the rise of the 
Inte rmation). 
ris, supra note 218, at 994–95. 
r the content of 
the 
e disclosure and disclaimer requirements 
wer 30 S. Ct. at 914. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. 
218 See Vassia Gueorguieva, Voters, MySpace, and YouTube, in Politicking Online 239, 
242 (Costas Panagopoulos ed., 2009); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Who Owns “hillary.com”? Politi-
cal Speech and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 55, 55–57 (2008); Benjamin 
Norris, Note, Fired Up! in the Blogosphere: Internet Communications Regulation Under Federal 
Campaign Finance Law, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 993, 994–95 
rnet as a source of political news and info
219 See Nor
220 See id. 
221 See West, supra note 207, at 63; Norris, supra note 218, at 994–95. 
222 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006) (disclosure provision); id. § 441d(d)(2) (disclaimer 
provision, requiring four-second message declaring who is responsible fo
advertising, applying to all electioneering television advertisements). 
223 Id. § 434(f)(1). The disclosure statement must include the identity of the person 
making the expenditure, the amount spent, the election sought to be influenced, and the 
names of certain contributors. Id. § 434(f)(2). Th
e upheld in Citizens United. 1
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didate.224 The effects of these provisions are threefold: they discourage 
improper affiliations between elected leaders and influential corpora-
tions, they promote informed voting, and they enhance enforcement of 
other rules.225 
llowed the proliferation of 
rga
successful political campaigns, there is cause to doubt the power of out-
                                                                                                              
D. Money in Theory, Money in Practice 
 Two other observations further suggest a limited effect of federal 
campaign finance laws before Citizens United.226 The first is that money 
is often difficult to contain.227 Restrictions on electoral spending in one 
area often have an unintended consequence of channeling the money 
into an unregulated area.228 The Tillman Act’s prohibition on direct 
corporate contributions to candidates, for example, channeled the 
money that corporations could no longer give to campaigns outright 
into paying for campaign staff and other incidental costs.229 A complex 
regulatory structure creates a danger of confusing rather than enlight-
ening the electorate by channeling money into obscure political advo-
cacy organizations with unknown sources of funding.230 The various 
PAC and tax regulations, for example, have a
o nizations funded entirely by for-profit corporate interests but oper-
ating under non-profit advocacy auspices.231 
 The second observation is that, although money is needed to run 
        
ampaign Finance Reform, 1998 Utah L. Rev. 311, 
326
tions because the candidates 
wou hat. See id. Of course, this scenario is exactly what 
BCR s 142–144 and accompanying text. But the “hydrau-
lic 
224 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2). 
225 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 255, 260, 270 
(2010); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against C
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226 See infra notes 227–237 and accompanying text. 
227 See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Re-
form, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1717 (1999). 
228 See id. For example, the effect of restricting direct candidate contributions has been 
to channel money into local parties, which then spend the money to help the targeted 
federal candidate. See id. The unintended consequence of restricting direct contributions 
to candidates was to create a new market for soft money, which had largely the same effects 
and created the same risks of corruption as direct contribu
ld simply be told who had donated w
A sought to prevent. See supra note
theory” is that corporate money earmarked for political purposes will always have a 
place to go. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 227, at 1708. 
229 See Urofsky, supra note 68, at 17. 
230 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128. 
231 See id. at 128; Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Mayer, supra note 225, 269–70 (noting that some organizations use “misleading 
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side money to deliver consistently favorable political outcomes.232 A 
correlative relationship between money and political outcomes is not 
the same as a causal relationship; more money may often simply reflect 
greater underlying constituent support for a candidate.233 At a mini-
mum, the “hedging strategy” of corporations—giving money to both 
parties—suggests that corporations lack complete confidence that their 
donations will lead to favorable political outcomes.234 Money buys ac-
cess, which in turns influences political outcomes in complicated, mor-
ally diverse ways.235 It is also worth noting that corporations are, in fact, 
important constituents in American democracy.236 The goal of cam-
paign finance laws is not to shut the door of democratic participation 
n c
gulations for reformers as they move into 
the post-Citizens United world.239 
IV. S and  
o orporations or unions, but to keep politicians honest.237 
 Of course, these observations do not address the substantive ques-
tion whether corporate spending should be contained in the first 
place.238 They do, however, help to illuminate the real-world experi-
ence of campaign finance re
how Me the Money: Improving Access 
Accountability in the Internet Age 
 This Note has so far suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in Citizens United v. FEC,240 which in 2010 struck down a law restrict-
ing corporate-funded electioneering on First Amendment grounds, is 
neither as powerful a blow to democracy, nor as consequential, as its 
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 accompanying text. 
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also Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign F
8 Hofstra L. Rev. 301, 308–09 (1989). 
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many critics contend.241 Since at least 1976, Supreme Court-imposed 
limitations on campaign finance statutes have effectively allowed corpo-
rations to fund political advertisements as they please.242 These limita-
tions have rendered even the most restrictive laws all but meaningless 
in practice.243 Moreover, not only have disclosure and disclaimer re-
quirements deterred elected officials from having improper relation-
ships with big corporate spenders, but the changing nature of the po-
tica
ing judgments 
                                                                                                                     
li l speech marketplace itself has also diminished the once mono-
lithic role of television advertisements in electoral messaging.244 
 The last Part of this Note builds on existing reform-minded schol-
arship245 and proposes an enhanced scheme of voter access to critical 
information about the financial and ideological origins of campaign 
messages.246 Specifically, in light of Citizens United’s doctrinal shift toward 
treating corporations and individuals the same for First Amendment 
purposes, reform advocates at the state and federal level should create 
and implement an enhanced system of disclosure requirements aimed 
at providing voters with easy access to the true financial and ideological 
sources of political information.247 These proposals will not address the 
danger of inequality in the electoral marketplace, which many campaign 
finance proponents have become accustomed to defending by arguing 
that corporations simply do not deserve First Amendment protection.248 
They will, however, address the risks of officeholders mak
based on improper commitments, such as staking only those legislative 
positions that are favorable to large business interests.249 
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 This Part begins with a brief survey of existing scholarship assess-
ing the Citizens United ruling and calling for reforms.250 Then, it pro-
poses that reformers have a unique opportunity to reassess the goals of 
the campaign finance project and the effectiveness of the laws they so 
assiduously defend.251 Reformers should harness popular sentiment to 
enact enhanced disclosure laws that mitigate the danger of corporate 
capture of elections by giving voters more expedient ways to discover 
the true f  
tion that any limitations upon political speech strike at the heart of the 
                                                  
inancial and ideological sources of political messages.252
A. After Citizens United: Criticisms and Calls for Reform 
 The mixed popular and scholarly response to Citizens United has 
reflected a shift in the balance of power between critics and defenders 
of campaign finance laws.253 On the one hand, those accustomed to de-
fending the Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Austin v. Michigan Cham-
ber of Commerce and its flexible view of corruption balk at the suggestion 
that the government cannot regulate corporate spending on elec-
tions.254 Business corporations are fictional entities created to amass 
wealth; their participation in political campaigns therefore does not re-
flect the wishes of voters, but of money itself, and its useful corollary, 
influence.255 On the other hand, former critics now defend the proposi-
                                                                    
n R. Hayward, Revisiting the Fable of Reform, 45 Harv. J. on Legis. 421, 425–26 
(200
s 
poli
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901, 912. 
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255 See Piety, supra no
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109, 126 (2004) (noting that the “first commandment” of corporations is profit maximiza-
tion for shareholders). 
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First Amendment and must be invalidated.256 That the business corpo-
ration enjoys certain state-conferred benefits does not remove its speech 
 the electorate rather than inform it, thus justify-
g c
from the same First Amendment protections that individuals enjoy.257 
 The doctrinal criticisms of the decision have been plentiful.258 Pro-
fessor Hasen contends that despite the Court’s effort to harmonize its 
post-Buckley framework, in reality the doctrine is as incoherent now as it 
ever was.259 Professor Teachout takes a more hairsplitting approach, 
assailing the decision as unduly disconnected from the realities of 
modern political campaigns, and in any case premature based on the 
sparse record before the Court.260 Another scholar argues that the de-
cision failed to recognize that campaign communications have the 
power to manipulate
in ertain restrictions.261 
 Reform proposals followed the decision in short order. Among 
them: reviving public financing schemes,262 increasing disclosure and 
disclaimer requirements,263 amending the Constitution,264 eliminating 
FECA’s contribution limit entirely,265 prohibiting independent expen-
ditures by foreign-controlled corporations or those with government 
contracts,266 requiring shareholder approval for political spending,267 
and conditioning public benefits such as the corporate form on a re-
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linquishment of the right to spend freely on elections.268 The legislative 
response, in particular, has tracked a general popular distaste with the 
proposition that corporations have free speech rights commensurate 
with those of individuals.269 The main Democratic response was the 
DISCLOSE Act, which would have, among other things, required or-
ganizations to disclose the identity of large donors and barred govern-
ment contractors, foreign corporations, and Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram recipients from making any political expenditures.270 That bill 
passed in the House bu  the Senate, reflecting 
art
ss resource inequality between different 
conceived to be the pernicious influence of big money” has actually suc-
                                                                                                                     
t stalled in late 2010 in
p y divisions.271 
B. A Boon for Reformers? 
 One accidental benefit of the Citizens United decision may be to 
force campaign finance proponents to rethink the main goals of elec-
tion laws and create workable—if modest—means to attain them.272 
Not only have the campaign finance project’s gradual changes failed to 
accomplish the ambitious goals motivating its original advocates, but 
the movement’s doctrinal justifications have also been mismatched to 
the Supreme Court’s post-FECA precedents.273 A reassessment aimed at 
mitigating the effects of gro
constituents in the electoral process may in the end lead to a regulatory 
system that more effectively balances the competing interests of fair 
elections and free speech.274 
 As noted,275 scant evidence supports the proposition that a century 
of federal enactments “designed to purge national politics of what was 
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269 See ABC News/Washington Post Poll Results, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/images/ 
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270 See generally Democracy Is Stre
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2010
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274 See Sullivan, supra note 182, at 176. 
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ceeded.276 Neither FECA nor BCRA appears to have curtailed the 
amount of money corporations have spent on national political advo-
cacy.277 In fact, if any trend can be discerned from a complex data set, it 
is that independent expenditures have risen dramatically in the twenty 
years since Austin.278 Between 1990 and 2002, for example, before BCRA’s 
“electioneering communications” restriction, outside spending on fed-
eral elections ranged from $7 to $50 million per year.279 By 2004, out-
side spending totaled over $200 million, and by 2010 (a non-presidential 
election year), outside groups spent over $300 million.280 These num-
bers should, at minimum, cast some doubt on the proposition that the 
rio
bric discredits the otherwise legitimate concerns about 
eso
va us legislative fixes over the years have successfully curbed corporate 
political spending.281 
 Moreover, the idea endorsed by the Supreme Court in Austin that 
independent corporate electoral advocacy threatens the integrity of 
democratic processes fits poorly within the corruption lexicon, as it re-
flects a concern not that voters or politicians will be “corrupted,” but 
that electoral outcomes (and thus policy outcomes) will reflect power-
ful and well-financed interests rather than the public interest.282 In con-
trast to quid pro quo corruption or undue influence, which involve 
identifiable perversions of democratic processes, “antidistortion” is a 
nebulous theory seemingly more about control over political outcomes 
than a concern about corruption.283 And the theory is rightly suscepti-
ble to accusations of paternalism, endorsing as it does a concern that 
voters subject to a greater quantity of ads will be misled, irrespective of 
the underlying truth or persuasiveness of the political message.284 
Whatever the merits of those concerns, shoehorning them into the an-
ti-corruption ru
r urce inequality, corporate capture of elections, and democratic self-
governance.285 
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 Citizens United has thus created an opportunity for reformers to 
realign the legal mechanisms of campaign finance reform with both 
the realities of a complex political system and the existing Supreme 
Court-imposed limitations on any attempts to choke off independent 
corporate spending.286 Recognizing the limited effectiveness of previ-
ous attempts to do so should help reformers take advantage of popular 
distaste with c ore effective 
ring communica-
Political advertisers spending more than a certain yearly threshold 
                                                                                                                     
orporate political influence287 to create m
tools for improving the electoral process.288 
C. Show Me the Money: A Proposal for Reform 
 Any reform attempt should include a strengthened disclosure 
framework to promote informed voting decisions through prompt, rele-
vant, and accessible information about each political message.289 Profes-
sor Kathleen Sullivan has argued that mandatory disclosure of political 
contributions is more effective in the age of instant mass-communica-
tion than when disclosure provisions were first enacted.290 In the wake 
of Citizens United, statutory reforms should extend mandatory disclosure 
to all independent corporate expenditures “in connection with” a fed-
eral election, not just express advocacy or “electionee
tions,”291 and should improve the FEC’s online database to provide the 
public with expedient ways to discover relevant financial and ideological 
information about corporate spending on candidates.292 
 One goal should be to give viewers readily accessible information 
online about each particular ad’s financial and ideological support.293 
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May 23, 2011). 
293 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916; Mayer, supra note 225, at 283. 
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amount in any medium should be required to embed in each message 
a visible or audible code allowing viewers to search online and learn 
who funded each message.294 For example, if a financial services firm 
buys an ad asserting that Senator Smith opposes tax breaks for the 
middle class, the end of the ad would contain a simple identifying code 
and a copy of the FEC’s website.295 The curious viewer could then enter 
that code on the website and view the ad’s funding sources.296 In addi-
tion, to address the potentially misleading effect of unions or corpora-
tions using shell advocacy organizations to produce campaign ads that 
ide
     
h  the ad’s true financial sources, the disclosure report should in-
clude a list of the top financial sources of each organization.297 
 Shifting gears from BCRA-type restrictions on corporate election-
eering to improved voter access to information about political messag-
ing would have several propitious consequences for future elections.298 
For decades, courts and regulators have classified ads based on whether 
they expressly advocate for or against a candidate, placing both in the 
untenable position of making content-driven (and ultimately meaning-
less) distinctions.299 By subjecting all political advertisers spending 
more than a certain yearly threshold limit on independent expendi-
tures—currently at ten thousand dollars300—to a new disclosure re-
quirement, regulators and courts could avoid wading into waters the 
government traditionally may not attempt to navigate.301 Moreover, dis-
closure-based rules may bring traditional campaign finance reform 
proponents and opponents together, as they serve the egalitarian goals 
of the former without offending the libertarian ideals of the latter.302 
To the extent that the Supreme Court has been inclined to recognize a 
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First Amendment right to anonymous speech,303 the Court’s ratifica-
tion of BCRA’s disclosure rules in Citizens United suggests that courts will 
continue upholding them absent a showing that they invite retaliation 
against corporate speakers.304 Voter information-centric disclosure also 
circumvents the concern that renewed attempts to constrict the flow of 
money into the political system post-Citizens United will just push more 
political money into the obscurity of a regulatory labyrinth.305 Notwith-
standing Congress’s attempt in BCRA to draw issue advocacy-funding 
PACs into the campaign finance system, third-party funders have been 
able to hide their involvement in political campaigns through anony-
mous donations.306 As long as Citizens United remains binding prece-
dent, creative new legislative efforts to limit corporate money in elec-
ons
rly, 
                    
ti , if they are not invalidated under strict scrutiny, risk sending more 
money into backdoor channels of influence.307 
 More generally, improved disclosure laws would advance many of 
the goals of pre-Citizens United restrictions on corporate spending.308 
The knowledge that voters, reporters, and opponents could immedi-
ately learn who funded a particular ad would encourage politicians to 
avoid the appearance or reality of inappropriate relationships with 
large-scale political spenders.309 In addition, knowing who funded a 
particular ad would enable voters to credit or discount a particular 
message, thereby diminishing the risk that well-financed interests will 
effectively drown out other voices by flooding the airwaves.310 Simila
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self-autonomy.314 In the same spirit of simplicity and 
transparency, perhaps it is also time to revisit the utility of the PAC des-
ignation itself.315 
rly twentieth century, 
to create a muscular new disclosure model fostering
and political accountability in the Internet age. 
Francis Bingham 
                                                                                                                     
the potential of voter backlash to excessive spending or unfair advertis-
ing would mitigate the dangers of corporate capture of elections.311 
 Adapting disclosure laws to the age of instant mass-communication 
would also promote truth in advertising and help voters making in-
formed choices when it matters most.312 Like juries, voters are the de-
mocratic system’s fact-finders; as in trials, accurate and relevant infor-
mation helps voters sort out issues of credibility and trustworthiness, as 
well as a candidate’s likely priorities and policy preferences.313 Giving 
voters the means and opportunity to assess political messages based in 
part on their financial and ideological sponsors would promote the 
First Amendment’s goals of democratic self-governance, the ascertain-
ment of truth, and 
Conclusion 
 Contrary to the claims of its most ardent critics and supporters, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC will neither 
poison nor particularly enhance American democracy. Although the 
decision denied the government’s ability to establish regulatory im-
pediments to unfettered corporate spending, the very assumption that 
the restrictions on independent corporate expenditures had actually 
succeeded before Citizens United is flawed. Campaign finance propo-
nents should take the opportunity to marshal popular sentiment, as 
Elihu Root and Theodore Roosevelt did in the ea
 voter information 
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